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We discuss and apply a new measure of competition: the elasticity of a ﬁrm’s proﬁts with respect
to its cost level. A higher value of this proﬁt elasticity (PE) signals more intense competition.
Using ﬁrm level data we compare PE with the most popular competition measures such as the
price cost margin (PCM). We show that PE and PCM are highly correlated on average. However,
PCM tends to misrepresent the development of competition over time in markets with few ﬁrms
and high concentration, i.e. in markets with high relevance for competition policy and
regulation. So, just when it is needed the most PCM fails whereas PE does not. From this, we
conclude that PE is a more reliable measure of competition.
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Abstract in Dutch
In dit paper gebruiken we een nieuwe indicator voor concurrentie: de winstelasticiteit van een
bedrijf (PE). Het centrale idee is dat in een competitieve markt inefﬁciënte bedrijven zwaarder
worden gestraft. Een toename in marginale kosten van 1 procent leidt tot een sterkere
winstdaling in een competitievere markt. Gebruikmakend van bedrijfsgegevens vergelijken we
de PE met traditionele maatstaven van concurrentie zoals de prijskostenmarge (PCM). We laten
zien dat PE en PCM sterk zijn gecorreleerd, maar dat is niet altijd geval. De PCM geeft een
verkeerd signaal af over het verloop van concurrentie in markten met weinig bedrijven en hoge
concentratiegraden. Dit zijn juist markten die relevant zijn vanuit mededingingsoogpunt en
regulering. Op grond van onze analyse concluderen we dat de PE een betrouwbaardere meting
geeft van concurrentie.
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56Summary
In this paper, we discuss and apply a new measure of competition: the proﬁt elasticity (PE) – the
percentage fall in proﬁts due to a 1% increase in (marginal) costs.1 An increase of this elasticity
indicates ﬁercer competition because ﬁrms are punished more harshly (in terms of proﬁts) for
losing efﬁciency.
In the empirical IO literature, several measures of competition are used with the Herﬁndahl
index (H), and price cost margins (PCM) among the most popular ones. However, both measures
have severe drawbacks from a theoretical point of view. This paper challenges those measures in
two ways: via simulations and via empirics.
As we are not aware of a deﬁnition of the concept of “competition”, we think it is not
controversial to distinguish the following two ways in which competition can be intensiﬁed in a
market: (i) more ﬁrms in a market due to a fall in entry barriers and (ii) more aggressive conduct
by incumbent ﬁrms.
Using simulations, a reduction in entry barriers leading to more intense competition is correctly
picked up by all three measures. However, in case of a change in conduct, the three measures
contradict. Changes in ﬁrms’ conduct are not correctly picked up by H due to a reallocation
effect of markets shares between ﬁrms. But the PE and PCM can be inconsistent as well if
reallocation effects are substantial. The PE-score turns out to be not correlated with the
reallocation effect, but the PCM-score clearly decreases with the size of the reallocation effect.
A higher reallocation effect increases the probability that PCM goes up after an increase in
competition.
Using ﬁrm level data, we have compared the evolution of H, PCM and PE over the period
1993-2002 for about 250 markets in the Netherlands. We show that PE picks up the effects of
competition in an intuitive way and, in fact, in a way similar to PCM. However, similar to the
simulation result, PCM and PE point in different directions in concentrated markets where the
reallocation effect is important, i.e. when H is high and the number of ﬁrms is low.
Finally, we have found empirical support for the idea that more intense competition (due to
more aggressive conduct by ﬁrms) removes inefﬁcient ﬁrms from the market thereby increasing
concentration. Such an increase in concentration should not be interpreted as a fall in intensity of
1 Jan Boone is attached to Department of Economics, Tilburg University, CentER, TILEC, ENCORE, UvA, IZA and CEPR.
Jan C. van Ours is attached to Department of Economics, Tilburg University, CentER, IZA and CEPR. Henry van der Wiel
is attached to CPB and Department of Economics, Tilburg University, CentER. We thank Harold Creusen, Free Huizinga,
Lapo Filistrucchi, seminar participants at ACLE, CCP, Ente Einaudi, NMa and participants at the NIE Christmas
conference at UEA for useful comments and suggestions. The data analysis reported in this document was carried out at
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7competition. Further, more intense competition also tends to increase the average productivity of
the remaining ﬁrms in the market (either due to a selection effect or because remaining ﬁrms are
forced to invest more to reduce costs). This can also raise PCM while it is not a sign of
weakened competition. Although the empirical evidence is based on Dutch cases, we are
conﬁdent that these results will be conﬁrmed in ﬁrm level data sets in other countries.
All in all, our results have the following implications. Competition authorities and regulators
should be careful to use observed increases in concentration and price cost margins in an
industry as evidence of collusion or abuse of a dominant position. If the industry under
consideration is already quite concentrated, such trends may actually be caused by rising
intensity of competition. Estimating PE is then a straightforward way to determine whether this
is the case or not. Further, because PE is such a robust measure of competition, we advocate its
use in empirical work analyzing the effects of competition on, say, efﬁciency, innovation and
unemployment.
81 Introduction
In the empirical IO literature, several measures of competition are used. It seems fair to say that
concentration measures, like the Herﬁndahl index (H), and price cost margins (PCM) are among
the most popular ones.2 However, from a theoretical point of view both measures have severe
drawbacks (see below and, for instance, Tirole (1988)). Our paper introduces a new measure of
competition that is more robust both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. We call
this measure the proﬁts elasticity (PE).3 PE is measured for a market and is deﬁned as the
percentage fall in proﬁts due to a percentage increase in (marginal) costs. In all markets, an
increase in costs reduces a ﬁrm’s proﬁts. However, in a more competitive market, the same
percentage increase in costs will lead to a bigger fall in proﬁts. The underlying intuition is that in
more competitive markets, ﬁrms are punished more harshly (in terms of proﬁts) for being
inefﬁcient.
Our paper argues that PE is a better competition measure than PCM and H. One way to make
this point would be to show that PE corresponds more closely to the deﬁnition of competition.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of a deﬁnition of the concept of “competition”.4 However, we
think it is not controversial to distinguish the following two ways in which competition can be
intensiﬁed in a market: (i) more ﬁrms in a market due to a fall in entry barriers and (ii) more
aggressive conduct by incumbent ﬁrms. We analyze the effects of both these ways to intensify
competition on the measures H, PCM and PE.
More ﬁrms entering a market tends to lower concentration in this market. Hence, more intense
competition due to more entry is correctly picked up by a concentration measure like H. The
problem with concentration measures as indicators of competition is that a switch to more
aggressive behavior by ﬁrms (e.g. because a competition authority detects and abolishes a cartel
that manages to raise price and divide the market between participants) forces inefﬁcient ﬁrms
out of the market (selection effect of competition). This raises concentration, but should (clearly)
not be interpreted as a fall in competition. Also more aggressive conduct by ﬁrms tends to raise
the market shares of efﬁcient ﬁrms at the expense of inefﬁcient ﬁrms. Such a reallocation (of
market share) effect raises H as well. We show that in our data set this reallocation effect can
dominate, leading to a (seemingly inconsistent) positive correlation between H and PE.
When PCM is used as a market measure of competition, it is usually calculated as market
2 In antitrust, concentration measures are important both in merger cases and in abuse cases (see, for instance, Bishop
and Walker (2002)). In the empirical IO literature, PCM is used as a measure of competition in papers like Aghion et al.
(2005), Nevo (2001) and Nickell (1996).
3 The measure is based on theoretical research in Boone (2000) and Boone (2008).
4 Of course, “perfect competition” is deﬁned. However, there is no generally accepted way in which “more intense
competition” in an oligopoly context is deﬁned.
9aggregate (variable) proﬁts over market aggregate revenues. This can also be written as the
weighted average of ﬁrms’ PCM’s where the weights are given by ﬁrms’ market shares (see, for
instance, Nickell (1996)).5 An increase in competition tends to reduce ﬁrms’ PCM’s. 6 If
competition is intensiﬁed due to a fall in entry barriers, PCM falls; correctly indicating more
intense competition. However, if competition is intensiﬁed due to more aggressive conduct, the
reallocation effect described above can counteract this effect. In particular, an increase in
competition raises the market share (and therefore the weight in the calculation of the market
average PCM) of efﬁcient ﬁrms with high PCM’s.7 Hence the weight of efﬁcient ﬁrms (with
high PCM) goes up which can raise the market PCM. This is the main problem with the market
PCM as a measure of competition that we focus on: an increase in competition due to more
aggressive conduct can actually raise the market PCM due to the reallocation effect. We identify
this effect in the data.
We also ﬁnd evidence suggesting another problem with PCM can play a role as well. If a
ﬁrm’s costs fall over time, its PCM tends to go up. Such an increase in PCM should not be
interpreted as a fall in competition. Indeed, conditional on a ﬁrm’s costs, a high PCM indicates
market power. But, conditional on price, high PCM reﬂects efﬁciency.
Using Dutch ﬁrm level data for 250 markets over the period 1993-2002, we show that PE picks
up the effects of competition in an intuitive way and, in fact, in a way similar to PCM. We
consider the correlation between PE and market characteristics like labor income share, import
penetration, average efﬁciency level of the ﬁrms etc. These correlations are comparable to the
results found for PCM. But the results for H differ considerably from the correlations found for
PE and PCM. From this we conclude that H is less suitable as competition measure than PE and
PCM.
Although PCM and PE look similar, they are not identical. When considering the change in
competition, we ﬁnd the following. In situations where the reallocation effect is strong, PCM
and PE may differ in the direction of the development of competition (one suggesting that
competition went up from one year to the next, the other that it went down). This happens in
concentrated markets with high H and few ﬁrms. Theory presented below then suggests that in
5 When ﬁrm level data is not available this is the only market PCM one can calculate. This is an advantage of the market
PCM compared to PE which does need ﬁrm level data to be estimated. However, ﬁrm level data is becoming more widely
available nowadays. Moreover, by comparing PE and PCM in our ﬁrm level dataset, we indicate in which markets it is
(relatively) safe to use PCM as a competition measure.
6 This is actually not always the case as shown in papers by Amir and Lambson (2000), Bulow and Klemperer (2002) and
Stiglitz (1987). There an increase in competition (through an increase in the number of ﬁrms in the market) can actually
raise some ﬁrms’ PCM’s. We do not address this problem in this paper.
7 This effect can be partly eliminated by using the unweighted PCM as measure of competition (as in Aghion et al.
(2005)). This reduces the problem caused by the reallocation effect to a certain extent (as shown in Boone et al. (2005))
but does not remove it completely: an increase in competition tends to remove inefﬁcient ﬁrms from the market with low
PCM which raises the average PCM in the market.
10these cases PCM fails while PE still is a consistent measure of competition. Note that the effect
of concentration implies that PCM and PE deviate in markets that are particularly interesting for
a competition authority: in highly concentrated markets an increase in PCM can be caused by
more intense competition. This strengthens the point made by Fisher (1987) that PCM is not a
good measure of monopoly power.
The next section discusses the related literature. In section 3, we use simulations to illustrate the
features of the PE measure. Further, we show circumstances under which PE and PCM deviate.
Section 4 describes the data on competition measures and shows some keys statistics. Section 5
analyses the measures PE, PCM and H in more detail. It shows that PE and PCM are correlated
in a similar way with market characteristics like labour income share, import penetration etc.
Then we show that an increase in competition intensity tends to increase PCM (incorrectly
suggesting softer competition) if H is high and the reallocation effect is large. Section 6
concludes. Appendix A and B respectively give details on the simulations and on how we
constructed our data set. In appendix C we report a number of robustness checks on how PE is
estimated.
11122 Related literature
There are numerous papers using measures of competition in the empirical IO literature. The use
of concentration as a measure of competition goes back to the structure-conduct-performance
framework. High concentration is then seen as a signal of weak competition which leads to high
prices and high price cost margins. See, for instance, Scherer and Ross (1990) for an overview.
Although, H as representative of the concentration rate indicators is easy to calculate if
ﬁrm-level data is available, its relation with competition is, however, not always straightforward
as the discussion above showed.
The PCM also has a long tradition as a measure of competition. Some papers (like Aghion et al.
(2005) and Nickell (1996)) calculate it directly as the proﬁts-sales ratio. Others, ﬁrst estimate
demand and cost functions and then calculate the optimal PCM for each ﬁrm under an
assumption on the relevant competitive model for the ﬁrms in the sector. Examples here include
Berry et al. (1995), Hausman et al. (1994) and Nevo (2001). By comparing a direct estimate of
the PCM (like the proﬁts-sales ratio) with the PCM predicted under different competitive
regimes, one can identify which competitive regime applies in a sector. This method has been
criticized by Corts (1999) who shows how the transitory nature of demand shocks leads to
overestimation of competition intensity. We do not take a stand on the issue of how the PCM
should be estimated. However, because we want to give an overview of how the competition
measures vary over markets, the direct way of calculating the PCM has obvious advantages. To
illustrate, with the direct method we do not need to gather additional information for all the
markets in our sample, like cost instruments, product characteristics and instruments for
consumers’ taste parameters (such as demographic variables).8
Hall (1988) developed a method to test for a positive PCM without actually calculating it
directly. The idea is that under constant returns to scale and perfect competition, the Solow
residual is not affected by instrumental variables like military spending and the oil price (Klette
(1999) generalized this method by allowing for increasing returns to scale). We do not use this
method for two reasons. First, the Hall-method tests whether there is either perfect competition
or market power. In the markets where there is market power (most of the markets in our
sample), the method does not provide a degree of market power. Second, for this method
convincing instrumental variables are needed which we do not have for all the markets in our
sample. Roeger (1995) adapts Hall’s method by combining primal and dual estimates of the
Solow residual. This allows him to estimate mark ups without the use of instrumental variables.
8 In the estimation of the PE measure, similar issues arise. In particular, one can choose a structural method to derive the
demand and cost curves and then from these curves calculate the proﬁt elasticity. For the reasons mentioned, we do not
use such a structural model in this paper.
13However, for Roeger’s method data is needed on the capital stock and the rental rate of capital.
Constructing a capital stock is rather complicated with ﬁrm level data, therefore we do not use
this method to estimate PCM. Moreover, we are particularly interested in changes in the
competition measures over time. Roeger’s method only provides an average PCM over time.
The PCM is often interpreted in a normative way: lower PCM is “better” in the sense that it is
associated with higher welfare. Although this is true in a very simple model, in general there is
no clear relation between PCM and welfare.9 Further, as pointed out by Fisher (1987) the
proﬁts-sales ratio is not a good measure of monopoly power because the user cost of capital is
hard to measure.10 The PE measure avoids this problem for two reasons. First, admittedly a bit
trivial, there is no simple benchmark for PE (like the –supposedly optimal– zero benchmark for
PCM). As shown by Boone (2003) the welfare maximizing value of PE depends on the
characteristics of a market, like the cost structure in the market and consumers’ tastes. Second, it
is not so much the levels of proﬁts and costs that are important for PE. The crucial issue is how a
change in (marginal) costs causes a change in proﬁts. To the extent that capital costs are ﬁxed
costs, we actually do not need to take them into account (although we will show that high capital
costs are associated with less intense competition). A related point here is that empirical
evidence is mounting which shows that more intense competition leads to more innovation and
higher efﬁciency (see, among others, Aghion et al. (2005), Klette (1999), Nickell (1996) and
Porter (1990)). If less intense competition leads to higher (marginal) costs due to X-inefﬁciency
or lack of innovations to reduce costs, PCM is reduced. This causes an overestimation of
competition using PCM. Again because PE does not focus on proﬁts and costs levels, it avoids
this pitfall. This is not to say that PE is robust to imperfections in the data. However, compared
to PCM data problems are not worse and may even be partly alleviated by PE.
The PE introduced here is reminiscent of the measure based on factor price elasticities used
by Panzar and Rosse (1987). In particular, they show that the sum of the factor price elasticities
of a monopolist’s revenue, denoted by ψ, must be nonpositive: ψ ≤ 0. Hence, if ψ > 0 for a
ﬁrm, it is not a monopolist. If ψ = 1, the ﬁrms in the sector are in a long-run competitive
equilibrium. In a monopolistic competition outcome one ﬁnds ψ ≤ 1. The statistic ψ is derived
as a test for monopoly. However, using ψ as a measure of competition has two main drawbacks.
First, if ψ ≤ 0, we actually do not learn anything, except that the sector is not in a long run
competitive equilibrium. A negative sum of elasticities is consistent with both monopoly and
oligopoly. In the oligopoly model used, one is the upperbound on ψ. There is no sense in which
ψ closer to one implies a more competitive sector. Second, to calculate ψ one needs information
on factor prices. This is usually harder to come by than information on revenue and costs.
9 See, for instance, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Amir (2002) for examples where lower PCM does not imply higher
welfare.
10 Fisher and McGowan (1983) give a related criticism on the use of accounting rates of return to infer market power.
14Moreover, we have no information on factor prices in our data set.
Finally, whereas we are mainly interested in competition in terms of aggressiveness of conduct,
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) focus on competition in terms of
entry. They focus on geographically isolated markets (for the same product) to establish the
relation between the size of the market and the number of ﬁrms in the market. This indirectly
gives information on ﬁrms’ conduct. As we are interested in the developments of competition
measures economy-wide over time, we do not use this relatively time-consuming method to
derive information on market power.
15163 Model
We use the following notion of competition. In a more competitive market, ﬁrms are punished
more harshly in terms of proﬁts for being inefﬁcient. In fact, PE estimates a relation between
ﬁrms’ proﬁts and (marginal) costs in a market. This section presents the theory underlying this
measure. The starting point is that there are two ways in which competition can be intensiﬁed.
First, competition becomes more intense as the number of ﬁrms in a market increases (for given
conduct) due to a fall in entry costs. Second, competition becomes more intense as ﬁrms’
conduct becomes more aggressive due to e.g. changes in consumer preferences. Using
simulations we show that the competition measures PCM and H work well in the former case but
not in the latter, this particularly involves H. We argue that PE picks up both forms of changes in
competition correctly.
3.1 Introduction of proﬁt elasticity
In any IO model, the relation between ﬁrm i’s proﬁt πi and marginal cost level ci is downward
sloping. Higher marginal costs ci imply –for given price pi– a lower margin per unit of output
sold. Further, higher marginal costs tend to lead to higher prices, which reduces the amount of
output xi sold. Roughly speaking, we use the following speciﬁcation of this relationship
ln(πi) = α −β ln(ci). (3.1)
With this linear speciﬁcation between ln(πi) and ln(ci), which can be viewed as a ﬁrst order
Taylor approximation, the slope β can be interpreted as an elasticity. It indicates the percentage
fall in proﬁts due to a one percent increase in marginal costs. We call β the proﬁt elasticity, PE.
To interpret PE, ﬁrst consider a simple monopoly model where the ﬁrm faces a constant
elasticity demand function x = p−ε where x denotes output and p the price charged. We assume











and proﬁts by π =
(ε−1)ε−1
εε c−(ε−1).





and β = ε −1 > 0. Hence in this case
the linear relation between ln(π) and ln(c) ﬁts the model perfectly. Higher β here implies that
the monopolist faces a more elastic demand curve, which indeed limits the monopolist’s market
power. In general the ﬁt will not be perfect and equation (3.1) is then interpreted as a linear
approximation. Further, if the ﬁrm is not a monopolist but faces competitors, then ε is
interpreted as the ﬁrm’s own price elasticity or the elasticity of its residual demand curve (which
exceeds (in absolute value) the market demand elasticity).
To get intuition for the case with more than one ﬁrm, consider the following standard
Cournot model. There is a market where each ﬁrm i produces only one symmetrically
17differentiated product, faces an inverse demand curve of the form
p(xi,x−i) = a−bxi −då
j6=i
xj,
and has constant marginal costs ci. This linear demand curve implies that the elasticity is not
constant and hence equation (3.1) is not a perfect ﬁt. The parameter a captures the size of the
market, the parameter b captures the market elasticity of demand and the parameter d captures
the extent to which consumers see the different products in a market as close substitutes for each






where we assume that a > ci > 0 and 0 < d ≤ b. The ﬁrst order condition for a Cournot Nash
equilibrium can be written as
a−2bxi −då
j6=i
xj −ci = 0. (3.2)

















We deﬁne a ﬁrm’s variable proﬁts as π (ci) = (a−bx(ci)−dåj6=ix(cj))x(ci)−cix(ci). These
are variable proﬁts in the sense that they do not include the ﬁxed cost f.
A ﬁrm with marginal costs ci enters the market if and only if π (ci) ≥ f in equilibrium. This
ﬁxes the number of ﬁrms N that enter in equilibrium where we assume that more efﬁcient ﬁrms
enter ﬁrst.
Since we cannot directly observe ci in the data, we approximate marginal costs with average
variable costs deﬁned as
cixi







To compare the behavior of the three competition measures, we use as starting point the
standard Cournot model for the case with a = 40,b = 30,d = 20, f = 0.004. Further, we draw
randomly cost levels ci for 110 ﬁrms out of a lognormal distribution with mean 0.7 and standard
deviation 0.08. Now, we change competition in two ways: (i) we change the entry cost and (ii)
we consider the effects of more aggressive interaction between ﬁrms. We begin with the ﬁrst
way.
The left part of Figure 3.1 presents a simulation with a change in the entry cost. The
comparison presented in the ﬁgure is between a situation with high entry cost (f = 0.02) and
low entry costs (f = 0.004). The relationship is steeper, PE is higher and competition more
intense with low entry costs than with high entry costs, as one would expect. In this case, PCM
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In particular, PCM falls from 0.32 to 0.22 and H falls from 0.016 to 0.010. Hence, all three
measures clearly indicate that lower entry barriers lead to more intense competition. This is true
more generally: reductions in entry barriers leading to more ﬁrms in the market and therefore
more intense competition are correctly picked up by all three measures.
Note that with the higher entry cost, ﬁrms’ proﬁts tend to be higher to cover this entry cost.
Hence the observations with f = 0.02 feature higher values on the vertical (ln(πi)) axis. Second,
prices will be higher with higher entry cost (fewer ﬁrms in the market). For given draws of ci,
the values of ci/pi shift to the left.
The second way to intensify competition is by more aggressive interaction between ﬁrms. In
this case, we increase competition by making goods closer substitutes: raising d from 20 to 30.11
We calculate the Cournot equilibrium. The small dots in right part of Figure 3.1 give the relation





before the increase in competition and the large dots the relation after
competition has become more intense. After the increase in competition, the relation becomes
steeper. Doing a simple OLS-estimation of PE with the data in this graph yields PE= 6.78
before and PE= 7.50 after competition is intensiﬁed. The number of active ﬁrms before and
after equals 101 and 74 resp. Hence under the more competitive regime, inefﬁcient ﬁrms can no
longer enter and concentration increases. H incorrectly suggests that competition has become
less intense, since the value increases from 0.010 to 0.014. The PCM falls here from 0.22 to
0.21. Hence PE and PCM correctly indicate that competition has increased after d goes up.
The reason why H incorrectly suggests a fall in competition when the interaction between
11 This is a fairly standard way in which competition is parameterized in the literature. See, for instance, Aghion et al.
(2005), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Vives (2004). The intuition is that product differentiation gives ﬁrms some
market power. Since products are different, there is no head-to-head competition between ﬁrms. Making goods closer
substitutes, reduces this market power and intensiﬁes competition.
19ﬁrms has become more aggressive is the reallocation effect. As competition becomes more
intense, market share is reallocated from inefﬁcient ﬁrms (with low initial market shares) to
efﬁcient ﬁrms (with relatively high initial market shares). Some inefﬁcient ﬁrms may even go
bankrupt due to the intensiﬁed competition and leave the market. This raises concentration in the
market incorrectly suggesting a fall in competition.
Because here the three measures can diverge, the simulations below entirely focus on
changes in conduct leading to more intense competition. Since concentration always increases in
response to more aggressive conduct, we no longer discuss H and focus on PCM and PE as
measures of competition.
3.2 Simulations of competition measures
The example in the previous subsection suggests that PE and PCM coincide in predicting the
change in competition in both ways of intensifying competition. However, this is not always
true. We use simulations to show that PE and PCM can point in opposite directions after an
increase in competition in the case of changes in conduct. In such cases, PE usually points in the
correct direction. Further, we show that two variables (i.e. H and reallocation effect) have some
power in predicting when PCM incorrectly points to less intense competition. The simulations
are based on the Cournot model with linear demand described above,12 where a = 40,b = 30 and
d equals (in the original situation) either 15 or 20. As above, competition is made more intense
by increasing d with 10 (to 25 and 30, resp.). Firm i produces with constant marginal costs equal
to ci and faces a ﬁxed cost that varies from f = 0.004 to 0.012. We assume that ci is drawn from
a lognormal distribution with mean 0.7 and standard deviation stdev which varies from 0.08 to
0.32. See table A.1 in the appendix for the details of the parameter values in the simulations.
For each combination of parameters we draw 110 values for ci, as above. We calculate which
of these 110 ﬁrms can proﬁtably enter (pay the ﬁxed cost f) under Cournot competition, where
ﬁrms are assumed to enter in order of efﬁciency (most efﬁcient ﬁrms ﬁrst). Then we increase d
with 10. This makes goods closer substitutes and is seen as an increase in competition. We
derive the new Cournot outcome, again calculate PE and PCM. This we do 100 times for each
parameter constellation (with each iteration we draw 110 new values from the cost distribution).
We count the fraction of times that a measure gets it right. That is, after the increase in d
competition has increased and PCM should decrease and PE should increase to signal this.
An aggregate change in PCM for a particular market is made up from changes at the ﬁrm
level, but also from the consequences of the interaction between ﬁrms in this market. Looking at
the productivity literature, several methods have been developed to decompose an aggregate
change (see Balk (2001) for an overview). We opt for a Laspeyres-type of decomposition.
12 These results do not only hold for the Cournot model, but also across other models as shown in Boone (2000).
























change in active ﬁrms effect
(3.4)
where I0(I1) is the set of active ﬁrms before (after) the change in competition, I = I0
T
I1 and
i ∈ I1\I if both i ∈ I1 and i / ∈ I. In words, the set I contains all ﬁrms that are active both before
and after the increase in competition. Working with a balanced panel implies limiting the data to
this set I. The set I0\I (I1\I) contains ﬁrms that are active before the increase in competition but
which are forced to exit after competition intensiﬁes (ﬁrms that are active after the increase in
competition but were not present before; in the simulations that we do below, this set is empty;
in the real data, however, this set is not empty).
In the simulations it turns out that PE and the within effect are strongly correlated. Since the
within effect (by construction) is not affected by the reallocation effect, in principle it is a better
measure of competition than PCM. In practice, however, there are two problems with the within
effect as a measure of competition. First, it has to be based on a balanced panel (the set I in
equation (3.4)). That is, if one wants to measure competition using the within effect consistently
over a period of, say, 10 years one can only use data on the ﬁrms that are in the panel for all 10
periods. This limits the number of observations considerably if a data set is based on a (rotating)
sample such as ours. Alternatively, one can calculate the within effect for consecutive years from
t to t +1 and then with a new sample from t +1 to t +2 etc. In this way, fewer observations are
lost. The disadvantage of this approach is that the reallocation effect plays a role again in the
comparison of competition between t and t +2 as the base changes between those years. In this
way, the within effect is not a consistent measure over the whole period. Second, in our data the
within effect is a magnitude 10 smaller than the change in active ﬁrms effect (due to the fact that
we use an unbalanced panel).13 Hence due to the noise in the other effects, we cannot use the
within effect in the data and do not report it here.
We use ﬁgures 3.2 and 3.3 to summarize the ﬁndings of the simulations. Each point in these
graphs is the result of 100 iterations for one particular choice of parameters. Figure 3.2 graph
shows the fraction of these 100 cases in which PE and PCM correctly indicate an increase in
competition (the parameter d is raised by 10) as a function of the average (over the 100
13 As shown in Table 4.2, in our data the average (standard deviation) of the within effect equals 0.02 (0.45), of the
reallocation effect 0.02 (0.19), interaction effect 0.01 (0.11), the entry part of the change in active ﬁrms effect 0.33 (3.53)
and the exit part 0.25 (0.21) where all effects are normalized by PCM.
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iterations) H before competition is intensiﬁed. A number of points follow from this ﬁgure. First,
PE performs very well with scores above 90% but it is not a perfect measure of competition. The
estimated PE may fall in response to a rise in competition if the relation between “Log” proﬁts
and “Log” costs is non-linear. Then the ﬁrst order Taylor approximation is no longer accurate.
22Entry or exit by ﬁrms relatively far removed from the other ﬁrms in the sample can then have a
disproportionate effect.14 Second, the PE score is not affected by the level of H. Third, PCM can
point in the wrong direction, for some parameter values with scores of below even 10%.
Moreover, the higher H initially is, the more likely it is that PCM increases after an increase in
competition. The reason is that high concentration is a necessary condition for a big reallocation
effect. Intuitively, if there are 1000 small ﬁrms in a market, an increase in competition will not
create much of a reallocation effect. Figure 3.3 relates the PCM and PE scores directly to the
reallocation effect as deﬁned in equation (3.4). The PE score is not correlated with the
reallocation effect, but the PCM score clearly decreases with this effect. A higher reallocation
effect increases the probability that PCM goes up after an increase in competition. The
reallocation effect can be identiﬁed in the data, as we show below.
14 In Appendix C we do a robustness check with respect to this non-linearity problem. In our data the linear approximation
is not always justiﬁed. However, as shown in table C.1 this does not affect our conclusions.
23244 Data on competition measures
In this section we take a ﬁrst look at the three measures PE, PCM and H based on Dutch ﬁrm
level data from about 250 markets over the period 1993-2002.15 We deﬁne a market to be a
3-digit SIC-code divided into small and medium sized ﬁrms (SMEs which have less than 50
employees) and big enterprizes (BEs which have 50 employees and more).
In our data set we do not have information on either quantity or price separately. Hence we
cannot calculate (marginal) cost per unit of output. Therefore we divide variable costs by
revenue assuming that marginal costs are constant. The theoretical model discussed in section 3
suggests that PE can indeed be estimated with this approximation of marginal costs. Moreover,
as suggested by ﬁgure 3.1, to estimate the relation between proﬁts and costs, we need not have
the data on all ﬁrms in the market. Clearly, more data is always better, but we can still estimate
the relationship reliably when we only have a sample of ﬁrms in the market. This is not the case
for measures like concentration and PCM which only make sense if the whole population can be
observed.
Table 4.1 gives the summary statistics for the variables that we use in the analysis hereafter
(see appendix B for their deﬁnitions). Here, we work with the full sample of markets.16 We ﬁnd
that on average (over all markets and years) PE equals 7: a one percent increase in costs leads to
a seven percent reduction in proﬁts. However, there is substantial variation in PE. In one market,
a one percent increase in a ﬁrm’s costs leads to a 39% fall in its proﬁts. The average values for
PCM and H equal 0.18 and 0.12, respectively. Moreover, the standard deviations of both PCM
and H are much smaller than the one for PE.
The variables DPE and DPCM denote ﬁrst differences in PE and PCM. It is interesting to
note that both variables are on average nearly zero. Table 4.2 gives the decomposition of DPCM
using equation (3.4). The following variables are used below to disentangle differences between
the competition measures. Labour income share is deﬁned as total wage costs over gross value
added. In other words, it is the share of labour in the surplus created by labour and capital. We
interpret a high labour income share as a property of the market that there are low capital
requirements to enter the market. In this sense, we view a high labour income share as indicating
low entry costs. The import share denotes the fraction of output sold on the domestic market by
foreign ﬁrms.17 Variance of average variable costs (AVC) is the variance (over ﬁrms in a market)
in our estimate of ﬁrms’ marginal costs.
15 In appendix B, we explain how we estimate PE. The calculation of PCM and H in the data is straightforward and has
already been discussed in section 3.
16 Van der Wiel (2008) also considers subsamples where PE is estimated with 10% signiﬁcance, where PE is restricted
to be positive etc. Similar results to the ones reported here are found.
17 Note that H is calculated on the basis of domestic revenues of domestic ﬁrms. This may introduce a spurious – positive
– correlation between import share and H. Such a positive correlation is indeed what we ﬁnd below.
25Table 4.1 Overview of variables
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Oberservations
PE 7.03 5.21 − 5.47 39.07 2104
D PE − 0.13 4.41 − 32.81 34.45 1851
PCM 0.18 0.10 0.02 0.85 2104
D PCM 0.00 0.05 − 0.50 0.61 1851
H 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.97 2104
Labour productivity 0.59 0.62 0.08 13.36 2104
Variance AVC 0.05 0.14 0.00 4.29 2104
ln (number of ﬁrms) 3.97 1.90 1.44 10.20 2104
Import share 0.30 0.27 0 0.91 2104
Labour income share 0.61 0.14 0.04 0.93 2104
Figure 4.1 summarizes the PE’s that we ﬁnd in the data with histograms. We give separate
histograms for the two sub-markets: SMEs and BEs. As one can see in this ﬁgure BEs have
substantially higher values for PE than SMEs (which is the main motivation for us to subdivide
markets in this way). This is in contrast to the idea in policy circles that entrepreneurs and SMEs
are key to economic performance. These ﬁrms supposedly increase productivity and
competitiveness. Moreover, with respect to innovative change, they are believed to play an
important dynamic role. In other words, these ﬁrms are claimed to face very intense competition
and therefore have a big incentive to reduce costs and innovate. We ﬁnd exactly the opposite. It
is the big ﬁrms that face the higher values for PE. If their costs go up by 1% the percentage fall
in proﬁts is bigger. Note that this is not just a trivial size effect as we consider the percentage
change in proﬁts.18
Table 4.2 Decomposition DPCM using equation (3.4)a
Effects Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Within 0.018 0.447 − 0.719 16.715
Reallocation 0.017 0.187 − 0.955 1.797
Interaction 0.010 0.112 − 0.615 3.009
Entry 0.334 3.526 0.000 149.728
Exit 0.252 0.213 0.000 1.000
a The decomposition is based on 1814 observations. Each effect is normalized by PCM in the base (0) year.
Figure 4.2 gives the histograms for PCM. PCM tends to be lower for BEs than for SMEs, again
showing that BEs are active on a more competitive market. Our interpretation is that in many
markets BEs compete on a national market while SMEs compete on local markets.
The histograms for H in ﬁgure 4.3 do not conﬁrm the results seen for PE and PCM. The
market for BEs tends to be more concentrated than the market for SMEs. Given that H is based
18 It is obviously the case that the absolute change in proﬁts due to an increase in marginal costs is bigger for a ﬁrm with a
higher output level.






































on market shares, it is not surprising that BEs tend to be active on highly concentrated
sub-markets.19 However, section 3 and the histograms above for PE and PCM clearly indicate
19 Remember that market shares –and thus concentration– are calculated for submarkets consisting of a 3 digit SIC code
and size class.


















that higher concentration should not (always) be associated with less intense competition.
285 Comparing measures of competition
This section ﬁrst considers the cross section correlations between the three measures. As in the
simulations and as suggested by ﬁgure 4.1 and 4.2, we ﬁnd that PCM and PE are closely
(negatively) correlated while H seems the “odd one out”. Although this might suggest that PE
and PCM always point in the same direction, this is not the case. We analyze the changes in
PCM and PE over time and ﬁnd that PCM tends to make mistakes in concentrated markets.
5.1 Properties of competition measures
It turns out that the (direct) correlation between PE and PCM is negative and signiﬁcant.
However, this could be a spurious correlation in the following sense. It could be that due to some
market characteristics one measure is low and the other is high (and the other way around). If so,
a negative correlation between the two measures may have to do with differences in these market
characteristics rather than with agreement between the two measures on the underlying intensity
of competition. To deal with spurious correlation we compare all three measures of competition
in two steps. First, we relate them all to market characteristics. Then, we investigate the partial
correlation between various measures conditional on the market characteristics.
Thus, in the ﬁrst step, we perform a number of regressions in which PE (and other
endogenous variables; see below) in market k at time t is explained through a number of market
characteristics that are assumed to be exogenous to competition.
PEkt = γ0+γt +x0
ktγ +εkt (5.1)
where x is a vector of market characteristics, the γ 0s are parameters – with γt being calendar year
ﬁxed effects20 – and ε is an error term.
Table 5.1 Properties of competition measuresa
PE PCM H Labour prod. Variance AVC Number of ﬁrms
Lab. inc. share 1.39 (10.6)** − 0.49 (14.3)** − 0.17 (3.7)** − 2.63 (5.6)** − 0.29 (5.8)* 1.46 (3.2)**
Import share 0.07 (0.7) − 0.02 (0.9) 0.11 (3.1)** − 0.09 (0.5) 0.02 (1.6) − 1.60 (4.1)**
Manufacturing 0.40 (8.4)** − 0.07 (5.5)** − 0.01 (0.6) 0.12 (1.2) − 0.08 (7.1)** − 1.34 (5.8)**
Big enterprises 0.19 (5.7)** − 0.02 (2.4)** 0.08 (6.4)** 0.15 (3.4)** − 0.04 (5.2)** − 1.47 (8.8)**
R2 0.385 0.642 0.189 0.376 0.185 0.503
a Based on 2104 observations (253 markets); all estimates contain ﬁxed effects for calender years; absolute t-statistics in parentheses
– corrected for clustering of observations across markets; a ** (*) indicates a parameter estimate signiﬁcantly different from zero at a 5%
(10%) level.
20 The calendar year ﬁxed effects are included to take cyclical effects into account.
29As market characteristics we use the labour share in value added, the import share, the type of
industry (dummy variable for manufacturing (1) vs. services (0)) and the average ﬁrm size
(dummy variable for large ﬁrms). We view these market characteristics as exogenous.
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the ﬁrst two characteristics are not completely exogenous to
the intensity of competition. To illustrate, intensity of competition in the product market can
affect labour unions’ bargaining power. If ﬁrms have market power, they may be able to affect
the wage rate and the labour income share. Further, domestic markets where ﬁrms hardly
compete are particularly attractive for foreign ﬁrms to enter, leading to a high import share.
These caveats should be kept in mind. However, we believe that both explanatory variables are
also driven by exogenous variation. The market’s technology determines how much capital is
needed to produce thereby affecting the capital income share and its complement the labour
income share. Also, some products are easier to import than others which affects the import
share. Markets where foreign products are close substitutes of domestic ﬁrms’ products will face
a tougher competitive regime. It is this effect that we try to capture.
We estimate equation (5.1) for PE, PCM and H. In addition to the referred market
characteristics we estimate this relation for variables that we believe are rather closely driven by
the intensity of competition: labour productivity, variance in average variable costs and the total
number of (domestic) ﬁrms in the market. One would expect that in a competitive market, labour
productivity is high while the variance in costs and the number of ﬁrms are small as inefﬁcient
ﬁrms cannot survive under intense competition.
Table 5.1 shows the estimation results.21 The labour income share has a positive effect on
PE. A high labour income share indicates low capital costs and hence it is easier to enter the
market. The import share has a positive but insigniﬁcant effect on PE. The dummy variable for
manufacturing industries also has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on PE. Conditional on the
other market characteristics there is more competition in manufacturing industries than in
service industries, conﬁrming what Creusen et al. (2006) found for the Netherlans. Also in
markets where large ﬁrms operate there is more competition. The second column of Table 5.1
shows the parameter estimates when PCM is the dependent variable. By and large the parameter
estimates are very similar – though of course with opposite signs. The third column of Table 5.1
presents how H is affected by the market characteristics. As expected the labour income share
has a negative effect on H. As less capital is required, it is easier to enter and concentration is
lower. The import share has a positive effect on H. This is due to the fact that the imports itself
are not taken into account when calculating H. More imports on a market lead ceteris paribus
the size of the market to less “space” for domestic ﬁrms. This tends to increase the domestic
concentration. H is also large for markets with big enterprizes. Since PE and PCM suggest that
markets with big enterprizes are more competitive, this suggests that more intense competition
21 Note that PE is divided by 10 in these regressions.
30can go together with high concentration. More intense competition removes inefﬁcient ﬁrms
from the market thereby increasing H. We come back to this point below.
The fourth column of Table 5.1 shows that the average labour productivity is low in markets
with a high labour income share. This may be due to the fact that such industries are labour
intensive and therefore labour productivity is low. Labour productivity is high in markets with
big ﬁrms and higher in manufacturing than in services. Import share does not have a signiﬁcant
effect on the average labour productivity. The ﬁfth column shows that the variance of the AVC is
inﬂuenced in the same way by market characteristics as the PCM. Finally, the last column in
Table 5.1 shows that the number of ﬁrms in the market is positively correlated with labour
income share. This also suggests that a higher labour income share is associated with lower
entry costs and hence more ﬁrms enter the market. The number of (domestic) ﬁrms is negatively
correlated with import share, manufacturing and the market segment with big enterprizes. Since
each of these variables are correlated with more intense competition (see columns for PE and
PCM) this again indicates that more intense competition due to more aggressive conduct leads to
fewer ﬁrms in the market.
Table 5.2 Partial correlation coefﬁcientsa
PE PCM H Labour productivity Variance AVC Number of ﬁrms
PE – − 0.147** 0.175** 0.091** − 0.026 − 0.207**
PCM – − 0.007 0.154** 0.178** 0.096**
H – 0.177** 0.008 − 0.571**
Labour productivity – 0.101** − 0.109**
Variance AVC – 0.017
Number of ﬁrms –
a The partial correlation coefﬁcients are calculated holding the exogenous variables and the calendar year effects constant.
Table 5.2 shows the partial correlation coefﬁcients between the three competition measures and
other variables closely related to competition. As shown PE and PCM are not only negatively
correlated through market characteristics. Also when keeping the market characteristics
constant, there is a signiﬁcant negative correlation between PE and PCM. This is mutually
consistent, i.e. if one measure indicates more (less) competition so does the other. However,
between PE and H there is a signiﬁcant positive correlation. At ﬁrst sight this seems
inconsistent. After all, higher PE means more competition and a higher H means less
competition. Yet, this conﬁrms the idea introduced above: in a more competitive market,
inefﬁcient ﬁrms cannot survive and concentration goes up. Table 5.2 also shows that average
labour productivity is positively correlated with PE. More intense competition weeds out
inefﬁcient ﬁrms and hence average productivity goes up after those ﬁrms have exit the market.
Furthermore, PE is negatively correlated with the variance of the average variable costs and with
the number of ﬁrms in the market. This also suggests that more intense competition weeds out
31inefﬁcient ﬁrms thereby reducing the variance in costs.
PCM and H are negatively correlated, also suggesting that more intense competition in terms
of lower PCM can go together with higher concentration. The partial correlations of PCM with
variance AVC and number of ﬁrms are in line with the correlations of PE (with opposite sign).
An interesting result is the positive correlation between PCM and labour productivity. This
suggests that more efﬁcient ﬁrms (higher productivity) have higher PCM for given mode of
competition. Although PCM suggests that competition is less intense in more efﬁcient markets,
PE points to more intense competition in such markets. Analyzing this point in depth is beyond
the scope of this paper. We leave it for future research to establish whether PCM can give the
wrong impression in markets where ﬁrms can affect their cost levels.
The partial correlations of H with labour productivity and number of ﬁrms are consistent with
the idea above that more intense competition removes inefﬁcient ﬁrms from the market, thereby
raising concentration and labour productivity while reducing the number of ﬁrms in the market.
As the average labour productivity is higher, ceteris paribus, the wider the range of
AVC-levels that can be supported by a market. More ﬁrms in the market is correlated with lower
average labour productivity. Finally, more ﬁrms on the market goes together with a higher
variance in AVC.
5.2 How (not) to measure changes in competition
In the empirical analysis above we ﬁnd that PE and PCM are affected by the same market
characteristics and conditional on these market characteristics they are signiﬁcantly negatively
correlated. Nevertheless, in section 3 we have shown that there may be circumstances in which
changes in PCM indicate, say, a fall in competition whereas PE shows an increase in competition
intensity.
As shown in Table 4.1, the average changes in both PE and PCM are close to zero. However,
in particular markets there may be (big) changes which are not always mutually consistent in
terms of changes over time in competition. It turns out that this happens in roughly one third of
the cases.22 To investigate this in more detail we ﬁrst localize the markets in which there is an
inconsistency between the two measures, i.e. markets where they are positively correlated from
one period to the next. In these cases one measure indicates an increase in competition while the
other measure indicates a decrease in competition intensity. We refer to these cases as being
strictly inconsistent. However, if the changes in the measures are close to zero, the fact that they
have similar signs does not matter that much. Such differences can be caused by observational
errors and not by underlying changes in competition intensity. Only if both changes in the
measures are substantially different from zero and with the same sign there is clearly something
22 Creusen et al. (2006) for the Netherlands and Boone et al. (2005) for the UK also ﬁnd such cases.
32wrong. We focus on these cases in the following way.















































We deﬁne a dummy variable Iz which indicates whether or not DPE and DPCM are inconsistent,
i.e. they have the same sign and are of sufﬁcient magnitude. More speciﬁc we deﬁne Iz = 1, if
DPE < µ1,z and DPCM < µ2,z (5.2)
or
DPE > µ1,100−z and DPCM > µ2,100−z (5.3)
and Iz = 0 otherwise. Here µ1,z is the value of the zth-percentile of the distribution of DPE and
µ2,z is the value of the zth-percentile of the distribution of DPCM. Hence Iz = 1 if both DPE and
DPCM are either “strongly” negative or “strongly” positive. In these cases the two measures
clearly contradict each other. This is illustrated by the shaded areas in ﬁgure 5.1. In addition, to
investigate the importance of the reallocation effect in the change in PCM we deﬁne a new
dummy variable “Big reallocation effect” which has a value of 1 if the reallocation effect
(relative to PCM) is below the 25th-percentile or above the 75th- percentile of the distribution of
reallocation effects.23
Now it is possible to investigate the determinants of the probability that the changes in the
two measures are inconsistent, for various values of z. Figure 5.2 (left part) shows how the
23 As argued in footnote 13 the within effect is too small to use here to identify the reallocation effect. Since the
reallocation effect is also quite noisy, we turn it into a dummy variable.
33probability of inconsistency increases with H. This is hardly perceptible for cases with strict
inconsistency (z = 50), but the increase is clear for low z values, i.e. when there is a big
inconsistency. Similarly, The right part of Figure 5.2 shows that this probability of inconsistency
is decreasing in the number of ﬁrms.
We investigate the determinants of inconsistency in more detail using a logit model to
estimate the probability of inconsistency and relate this to H, number of ﬁrms and the
reallocation dummy. Table 5.3 presents the parameter estimates. Even if we consider the
situation in which DPE and DPCM have the same sign – the changes are strictly inconsistent – H
has a positive and signiﬁcant effect (although this is not visible in the left part of ﬁgure 5.2). The
number of ﬁrms in the market has a negative and signiﬁcant effect on the probability of
inconsistency for values of z below 45. Intuitively, with many small ﬁrms in the market, the
reallocation effect will not be big enough to push PCM in the “wrong” direction. Further, the
effects of the reallocation dummy are signiﬁcant for low values of z.24 In markets with a high H,
a low number of ﬁrms and a big reallocation effect we ﬁnd that the probability of inconsistency
between PCM and PE is large.
We conclude that the reallocation effect is responsible for the inconsistency between the
changes in PE and PCM. There is direct evidence because the probability of inconsistency
increases with the size of the reallocation effect. There is also indirect evidence because the
probability of inconsistency increases with H and falls with the number of ﬁrms. For this effect
to be signiﬁcant, we need to focus more on the tails of the distributions of DPE and DPCM
(z = 40 and z = 35).
Figure 5.2 Probability of inconsistency as function of deciles (left=the H-index; right= number of ﬁrms in market)
24 We also investigated whether other variables used in tables 5.1 and 5.2 are important but none of them differed
signiﬁcantly from zero in any of the estimates.
34Table 5.3 Probability of inconsistency between DPE and DPCM; parameter estimates logit model a
H-index Big reallocation effect Number of ﬁrms % Inconsistent
Strictly inconsistent 0.60 (1.7)* – –
0.59 (1.6) 0.06 (0.8) –
0.33 (0.7) 0.06 (0.7) − 0.03 (0.9) 45.7
z = 45 1.52 (3.7)** – –
1.48 (3.6)** 0.16 (1.6) –
0.70 (1.4) 0.15 (1.5) − 0.08 (2.2)** 36.4
z = 40 2.17 (5.0)** – –
2.12 (5.0)** 0.25 (2.4)** –
0.91 (1.8)* 0.23 (2.3)** − 0.14 (3.3)** 27.9
z = 35 2.85 (6.3)** – –
2.79 (6.5)** 0.44 (3.9)** –
1.53 (2.9)** 0.42 (3.7)** − 0.15 (4.3)** 20.8
a Based on 1851 observations (250 markets); absolute t-statistics corrected for clustering of observations across markets; a ** (*)
indicates a parameter estimate signiﬁcantly different from zero at a 5% (10%) level.
35366 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce a new measure of competition: the proﬁt elasticity PE – the
percentage fall in proﬁts due to a 1% increase in (marginal) costs. An increase of this elasticity
indicates an increase in competition because ﬁrms are punished more harshly (in terms of
proﬁts) for losing efﬁciency.
In general, PE and PCM are consistent, whereas changes in ﬁrms’ conduct are not correctly
picked up by H due to a reallocation effect of markets shares between ﬁrms. However, we argue
that PE and PCM can be inconsistent as well if ﬁrms’ conduct changes. To analyze this, we have
compared their evolution over time for about 250 markets in the Netherlands. It turns out that
PCM and PE point in different directions (one suggesting that competition went up while the
other suggests that competition went down) in concentrated markets where the reallocation
effect is important, i.e. when H is high and the number of ﬁrms is low. Simulations suggest that
in such markets PCM can increase in response to more intense competition. Hence in highly
concentrated markets i.e. in markets that are most relevant for competition policy and regulation,
one should be careful using PCM as a measure of competition intensity.
Finally, we have found empirical support for the idea that more intense competition (due to
more aggressive conduct by ﬁrms) removes inefﬁcient ﬁrms from the market thereby increasing
concentration. Such an increase in concentration should not be interpreted as a fall in intensity of
competition. Further, more intense competition also tends to increase the average productivity of
the remaining ﬁrms in the market (either due to a selection effect or because remaining ﬁrms are
forced to invest more to reduce costs). This can also raise PCM while it is not a sign of
weakened competition. Although the empirical evidence is based on Dutch cases, we are
conﬁdent that these results will be conﬁrmed in ﬁrm level data sets in other countries.
All in all, our results have the following implications. Competition authorities and regulators
should be careful to use observed increases in concentration and price cost margins in an
industry as evidence of collusion or abuse of a dominant position. If the industry under
consideration is already quite concentrated, such trends may actually be caused by rising
intensity of competition. Estimating PE is then a straightforward way to determine whether this
is the case or not. In this sense, just when H and PCM are needed the most they are not reliable.
Further, because PE is such a robust measure of competition, we advocate its use in empirical
work analyzing the effects of competition on, say, efﬁciency, innovation and unemployment.
3738Appendix A Simulations
Table A.1 gives the details of the simulations presented in the main text. Simulations are with
a = 40,b = 30 and ci drawn from log normal distribution with mean 0.7 and standard deviation
st.dev. Competition becomes more intense by raising d with 10.
Table A.1 Simulations results
d f st.dev. PCM-scorea PE-scoreb Hc Reallocationd PCM e PEf
15 0.004 0.08 1.00 1.00 0.0093 0.047 0.26 − 7.37
15 0.004 0.16 1.00 1.00 0.0102 0.070 0.28 − 6.87
15 0.004 0.24 0.83 1.00 0.0114 0.085 0.32 − 6.16
15 0.004 0.32 0.67 0.94 0.0124 0.095 0.36 − 5.63
15 0.008 0.08 1.00 1.00 0.0096 0.079 0.26 − 6.89
15 0.008 0.16 0.78 1.00 0.0110 0.094 0.30 − 6.02
15 0.008 0.24 0.45 0.97 0.0122 0.104 0.34 − 5.40
15 0.008 0.32 0.31 0.94 0.0132 0.115 0.37 − 4.95
15 0.012 0.08 0.82 1.00 0.0104 0.098 0.28 − 6.26
15 0.012 0.16 0.46 1.00 0.0118 0.108 0.32 − 5.47
15 0.012 0.24 0.23 1.00 0.0131 0.119 0.35 − 4.92
15 0.012 0.32 0.14 0.99 0.0140 0.128 0.39 − 4.53
20 0.004 0.08 0.91 1.00 0.0101 0.054 0.22 − 8.68
20 0.004 0.16 0.37 0.96 0.0121 0.069 0.27 − 7.34
20 0.004 0.24 0.09 0.93 0.0137 0.081 0.31 − 6.48
20 0.004 0.32 0.09 0.92 0.0150 0.091 0.35 − 5.87
20 0.008 0.08 0.30 1.00 0.0116 0.074 0.25 − 7.36
20 0.008 0.16 0.10 0.99 0.0135 0.086 0.29 − 6.28
20 0.008 0.24 0.06 0.97 0.0151 0.096 0.33 − 5.61
20 0.008 0.32 0.07 0.96 0.0164 0.103 0.37 − 5.11
20 0.012 0.08 0.06 1.00 0.0131 0.086 0.28 − 6.53
20 0.012 0.16 0.04 1.00 0.0150 0.096 0.32 − 5.67
20 0.012 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.0165 0.107 0.36 − 5.06
20 0.012 0.32 0.02 0.98 0.0177 0.116 0.39 − 4.64
a Fraction of cases in which PCM decreases (correctly pointing at increase in competition)
b Fraction of cases in which PE increases (correctly pointing at increase in competition)
c Average value of Herﬁndahl index before increase in competition
d Average value of reallocation effect
e Average value of PCM before increase in competition
f Average value of PE before increase in competition
3940Appendix B Data and measurement issues
Initial uncleaned data set
The estimates for PE, PCM and H are based on ﬁrm-level data for the Netherlands. These data
are derived from the annual survey for the Production Statistics (PS) by Statistics Netherlands.
The survey gives complete coverage of ﬁrms with at least 20 employees, while ﬁrms with fewer
than 20 employees are sampled. This paper focuses on the period 1993-2001 (and 2002 for
service industries). The data set has been constructed after matching the detailed accounting data
over time. We have no data at our disposal on the agriculture and ﬁshing industry, banking and
insurance, public utilities and health care industries but otherwise we cover all industries in the
Netherlands.
It turns out that the matched data set was not complete for all industries in manufacturing and
wholesale trade. For some industries at the 3 digit SIC code, observations for certain years were
missing for ﬁrms with size less than 100 employees. Therefore, we excluded all observations of
these industries. Furthermore, for the analysis of the competition measures, we leave out ﬁrms
without employees.
From uncleaned to cleaned data set
Unprocessed ﬁrm-level data may contain errors for various reasons. In order to obtain reliable
ﬁrm-level data we performed several ‘cleaning’ activities (largely similar to Creusen et al.
(2006)). We removed: 1) observations of ﬁrms with no turnover and employment; 2) the second
observation of the same ﬁrm in one year; 3) observation of year t+1 if a ﬁrm has identical output
and employment data (or value added) in two consecutive years; 4) observation of ﬁrms with
negative variable proﬁts; 5) observations of ﬁrms with negative intermediate inputs; 6)
observations of ﬁrms with huge changes in key variables as output and employment; in
particular, ﬁrms with more than 500% increase in turnover or employment or decrease by more
than 80% in these variables. Finally, due to conﬁdentiality requirements of Statistics
Netherlands, we had to remove 3-digit SIC industries if less than 5 ﬁrms per year were available.
Table B.1 shows that the consequences of all those cleaning steps are limited. All in all,
approximately 52 000 ﬁrms (i.e approximately 18 percent) have been removed from the matched
data set to obtain a clean data set for further analysis. This cleaned data set contains almost
240,000 observations over the period 1993-2002 based on information of about 90,000 different
ﬁrms in the Netherlands from 139 industries at the 3-digit SIC-level.
Basic variables
To measure and analyze the three competition measures, we use a number of variables. Table
B.2 provides a brief overview of their derivation and sources. Except for the import share, which
41Table B.1 Comparison of uncleaned and cleaned data set, 1993-2002
Variable Uncleaned dataset Cleaned dataset
Number of ﬁrms 288660 236346
Average ﬁrm size sample 71 74
Number of workers (x1000) 27559 23718
Labour productivity 0.45 0.47
AVC 0.85 0.82
PCM 0.16 0.18
is derived from the National Accounts of Statistics Netherlands, all indicators are based on the
PS. Gross output denotes the output of ﬁrms including other activities (e.g. industrial services
such as installation costs). Labour costs are deﬁned as the salary of employees including social
security charges and extra allowances. Intermediate inputs consist of costs like materials, energy
and marketing. The variable costs are calculated as the sum of the labour costs and the
intermediate inputs. Because data on marginal costs are absent, we use the variable costs over
gross output (average variable costs, AVC) as an approximation. Proﬁts (π) are deﬁned as ﬁrm’s
revenue (or gross output) minus variable costs. The deﬁnitions of PCM and H are discussed in
the main text. Labour productivity is deﬁned as the (un-weighted) average labour productivity of
the ﬁrms in an industry, where labour productivity is deﬁned as gross value added per worker.
Labour income share is deﬁned as total wage costs over gross value added – gross output minus
intermediate inputs. Finally, the import share denotes the fraction of revenue on the domestic
market of products from outside the Netherlands.
Table B.2 Overview of main variables and sources
Variable Method Source
Gross output directly available PS
Labour costs directly available PS
Intermediate inputs directly available PS
Variable costs derived PS





Labour productivity derived PS
Labour income share derived PS
Import share derived National Accounts
42Measuring PE
Theory suggests that an increase in competition (say, ﬁrms switch to more aggressive conduct or
an additional ﬁrm enters the market) increases the proﬁts of a ﬁrm relative to the proﬁts of a less
efﬁcient ﬁrm. In particular, it is not necessarily the case that an increase in competition reduces
every ﬁrm’s proﬁts. Some efﬁcient ﬁrms may gain from more intense competition as it allows
them to exploit their cost advantage more aggressively. As shown in Boone (2000) and Boone
(2008), an increase in competition increases proﬁts of a ﬁrm relative to a less efﬁcient ﬁrm. We
denote the proﬁts and marginal costs at time t of this benchmark ﬁrm by resp. ¯ πt, ¯ ct. The
benchmark ﬁrm could be the median ﬁrm or the least efﬁcient ﬁrm in the market. The exact
identity of this ﬁrm does not matter as it will end up in the time ﬁxed effects, as explained below.
A further advantage of normalizing proﬁts and costs in this way, is that it automatically corrects
for inﬂation which affects numerator and denominator (πit and ¯ πt and resp. cit and ¯ ct) in the
same way.
In our analysis, we allow for the fact that we cannot perfectly observe the relevant values for
ﬁrms’ proﬁts and marginal costs. For instance, a ﬁrm may produce other products than the
products for the market under consideration. The statistical ofﬁce (or other agency gathering the
data) may decide to classify these sales and costs of other products under the same heading
(industry classiﬁcation). We denote the observed proﬁt level for ﬁrm i at time t by πitui. Hence
the observation error equals (ui −1)πit. Similarly, the observed marginal costs are denoted by
citvi. The assumption that we make is that these observation errors may differ between ﬁrms but
are constant over time (or, if the observational errors do change over time, they change in the
same way for all ﬁrms in a sector such that they are picked up by the time ﬁxed effect).













ln(πit) = αi +αt −βt ln(cit)+εit (B.1)
For each market, deﬁned by a 3 digit SIC industry divided into SMEs and BEs we estimate
equation (B.1).26
25 The ﬁrm ﬁxed effect is given by
αi ≈ α −ln(ui)−βt ln(vi)
Note that the ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are really ﬁxed if βt = β. We use an approximation which holds if the variation in vi is much
bigger than the variation in βt. The time ﬁxed effect is given by
αt = ln( ¯ πt)+βt ln(¯ ct).
26 To control for changes of ﬁrms over time with respect to their SIC-code and their size class, ﬁrms are classiﬁed
according to their SIC-code most reported and to their lowest size class level in the period observed.
43Equation (B.1) contains constructed variables based on the same information on both the left
and the right hand side. In particular, the proﬁt variable on the left hand side is calculated as the
difference between revenues and costs, the costs variable on the right hand side is calculated as
the ratio of costs and revenues (to get a cost per unit variable). Measurement errors in ﬁrms’
revenues or costs will tend to overemphasize the effects of costs on proﬁts and hence PE will be
overestimated. Nevertheless, as long as the errors are uncorrelated with a change in competition
the change in PE will be measured correctly. Furthermore, to the extent that the measurement
errors are time invariant they will be picked up by the ﬁrm ﬁxed effects.27 This also includes
unobserved explanatory variables that are constant over time but may have an impact on proﬁts.
Although it is possible that the parameter estimates of PE are a mixture of “signal” and “noise”,
it is clear that the signal dominates as shown in the main text. Finally, Appendix C reports four
robustness checks in the estimation of PE and shows that the main results are unchanged.
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the three competition measures and some market
characteristics. Ideally, the number of observations should be 139*2*10=2780 (i.e. 139 3-digit
SIC-industries divided into SMEs and BEs for the period 1993-2002). However, the full sample
contains less observations: 2104 observations. This smaller set is due to that (i) for
manufacturing industries data only runs to 2001; (ii) not for every SIC-code SMEs or BEs are
available; (iii) some SIC-codes are absent in particular years.
27 Note that the potential bias introduced by the measurement errors may be corrected by the use of instrumental
variables. Unfortunately, we do not have ﬁrm characteristics that could be used as instrumental variables.
44Appendix C Robustness checks
To investigate the robustness of our estimation results, we run four alternative equations
compared to our basic equation (B.1).28
The ﬁrst alternative way to estimate PE is that we switch places for the dependent variable
and the explanatory variable. In fact, this is one way to test the impact of measurement problems
ln(cit) = αi +αt − ˜ βt ln(πit)+εit (C.1)
In this case, PE is deﬁned as PEt = 1/ ˜ βt
The second alternative allows for a non-linear relationship between ln(πi) and ln(ci):
ln(πit) = αi +αt −β1t ln(cit)+β2t(ln(cit))2+εit (C.2)
Due to this non-linearity, the results for the β’s cannot be directly interpreted as a measure of
market competition. Taking the ﬁrst derivative of (C.2) with respect to c, we get
∂ ln(πit)
∂ ln(cit)
= −β1t +2β2t ln(cit) (C.3)
which is different for different ﬁrms in the market. A market value for PE can now be derived by
using the market average of the marginal cost (¯ cit) as follows: PEt = −β1t +2β2t ln(¯ cit).
The third alternative measure for PE is that we use a balanced panel instead of an unbalanced
panel to make sure that our results are not driven by panel attrition. To be left with sufﬁcient
observations, we use a balanced panel for two subperiods: 1993-1997 and 1998-onwards
respectively.
The fourth alternative is that we adjust the marginal cost concept accounting only for the
labour costs and neglecting the costs for materials and other intermediate inputs. This relaxes the
problem of using the same variables to construct the left hand side and right hand side of
equation (B.1). Table C.1 checks whether our main result is robust to these alternative
speciﬁcations of PE. Indeed we ﬁnd for all four alternatives that the probability of inconsistency
is higher in more concentrated markets (higher H and lower number of ﬁrms). For alternatives 1,
3 and 4 it is also the case that a big reallocation effect raises the probability of inconsistency. In
this sense, the main result in section 5.2 is robust to different ways in which PE can be estimated.
28 More details can be found in Van der Wiel (2008), which examines a number of ways to estimate PE and analyzes the
estimation results for a number of subsamples. Results turn out to be robust.
45Table C.1 Comparing alternative Proﬁt elasticities – Probability of inconsistency betweenDPE andDPCM; para-
meter estimates logit model – z = 35a
H-index Big reallocation effect Number of ﬁrms % Inconsistent
Baseline 2.85 (6.3)** – –
Alternative 1 3.49 (6.2)** – –
Alternative 2 3.52 (6.8)** – –
Alternative 3 2.56 (5.4)** – –
Alternative 4 2.95 (6.3)** – –
Baseline 2.79 (6.5)** 0.44 (3.9)** –
Alternative 1 3.45 (6.3)** 0.26 (2.2)** –
Alternative 2 3.49 (6.8)** 0.16 (1.4) –
Alternative 3 2.51 (5.4)** 0.28 (2.6)** –
Alternative 4 2.90 (6.3)** 0.26 (2.3)** –
Baseline 1.53 (2.9)** 0.42 (3.7)** − 0.15 (3.4)** 20.8
Alternative 1 2.38 (2.8)** 0.24 (2.1)** − 0.13 (2.6)** 20.4
Alternative 2 0.26 (0.5) 0.11 (1.0) − 0.39 (8.3)** 25.2
Alternative 3 1.04 (1.7)* 0.25 (2.5)** − 0.17 (3.5)** 19.7
Alternative 4 1.07 (2.0)** 0.23 (2.1)** − 0.21 (4.5)** 23.8
a Based on 1851 observations (250 markets); absolute t-statistics corrected for clustering of observations across markets; a ** (*)
indicates a parameter estimate signiﬁcantly different from zero at a 5% (10%) level.
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